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INTRODUCTION
The lead-up to the Supreme Court’s Fall 2019 term was steeped
in controversy. The Court’s first gun rights case in nearly a decade,
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, quickly
became more about the far less exciting justiciability doctrine of
mootness and the legitimacy of the Court than the Second Amend-
ment.1 Promptly after the Court granted certiorari, in a clear
attempt to prevent the Court from creating unfavorable precedent,
New York City repealed and amended its stringent gun transpor-
tation rule.2 Then, for good measure, the state legislature passed a
law rendering the city’s old rule illegal.3 To pile onto the contro-
versy, a group of five United States senators submitted an unprece-
dented amicus brief ordering the Court to drop the case or face
potential restructuring.4 In a brief per curiam opinion, six Justices
held that the city’s repeal of the rule successfully rendered the case
moot.5 In his dissenting opinion arguing that the case was not moot
and that New York’s rule violated the Second Amendment, Justice
Alito warned that the Court has “been particularly wary of attempts
by parties to manufacture mootness in order to evade review.”6
Despite Justice Alito’s admonition, lower federal courts have not
been so skeptical of defendants’ attempts to evade review. This is
particularly true in cases involving voluntary cessation by govern-
ment defendants. Voluntary cessation, a general exception to the
mootness doctrine, provides that a case does not become moot
1. See 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526 (2020) (per curiam).
2. See id. at 1527 (Alito, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 1528.
4. Brief of Senators Sheldon Whitehouse et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 18, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020)
(No. 18-280) (“The Supreme Court is not well. And the people know it. Perhaps the Court can
heal itself before the public demands it be ‘restructured in order to reduce the influence of
politics.’”); see also Robert Barnes, Warning or Threat? Democrats Ignite Controversy with




5. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. at 1526.
6. Id. at 1533 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Knox v. Serv. Emps., 567
U.S. 298, 307 (2012)).
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merely because the defendant ceases the challenged conduct.7
However, many courts held that government defendants are entitled
to a presumption that they act in good faith when strategically
mooting cases by voluntarily ceasing the challenged conduct.8 For
instance, in a recent case, Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, the Seventh
Circuit held that state university officials were presumed to have
acted in good faith when, mere days into litigation, they repealed a
challenged university policy limiting students’ free speech on cam-
pus.9 Therefore, the students’ challenge was moot.10 These two
cases—New York Rifle and Killeen—present the central question
that motivates this Note: to what extent should public defendants
be treated differently than private defendants when manufacturing
mootness to evade judicial review?
The idea that public defendants should receive any special treat-
ment in the mootness context has been subject to intense criticism
among commentators. Most notably, in the lead-up to the New York
Rifle decision, Joseph Davis and Nicholas Reaves—two prominent
First Amendment litigators from the Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty—urged the Supreme Court to take the opportunity to cor-
rect the lower courts’ practice of blessing government abuse of the
voluntary cessation doctrine.11 Indeed, the Supreme Court has never
adopted a presumption in favor of government defendants such as
the one applied by the Seventh Circuit in Killeen,12 and it failed to
do so in New York Rifle. Rather, lower courts have created the pre-
sumption out of whole cloth, “invok[ing] purely prudential concerns
about the supposed public-spiritedness of government litigants.”13
While this prudential, good-faith presumption would be anathema
to Framers like James Madison who knew that government is
7. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189
(2000).
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. 968 F.3d 628, 645 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[W]hen the defendants are public officials ... we
place greater stock in their acts of self-correction, so long as they appear genuine.” (citation
omitted)).
10. Id. at 646.
11. See Joseph C. Davis & Nicholas R. Reaves, The Point Isn’t Moot: How Lower Courts
Have Blessed Government Abuse of the Voluntary-Cessation Doctrine, 129 YALEL.J.F. 325, 325
(2019).
12. See id. at 332-35.
13. Id. at 328.
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composed of men and not angels,14 institutional concerns related to
state sovereignty may justify the different treatment afforded to
public defendants.
This Note attempts to fill a void in the literature by advocating
for a presumption in favor of government defendants in voluntary
cessation cases rooted more in structural, rather than merely pru-
dential, justifications. In particular, the Note pulls from a more fully
developed body of literature surrounding sovereign state standing
to argue that the same principles of sovereignty that grant states
broad standing to sue require courts to give more weight to exer-
cises of state lawmaking authority to moot certain cases. However,
this special treatment cannot exist in perpetuity. Once the state ac-
tion becomes far enough removed from the sovereign lawmaking
process—action by a university official, for instance—this structural
justification no longer holds, and public litigants should be held to
the same mootness standards as private defendants.
Part I of this Note summarizes the mootness doctrine and its
various exceptions. Part II analyzes the varying approaches taken
by federal courts in applying the voluntary cessation exception to
public defendants. Part III provides an overview of state sovereignty
and how that sovereignty applies in the mootness context. Part IV
draws on principles of state sovereignty in the standing context to
advocate a new standard to apply to voluntary cessation cases: the
sovereignty standard. Finally, Part V applies the sovereignty
standard to define the bounds of manufactured sovereign state
mootness.
I. MOOTNESS DOCTRINE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
It is well settled that a federal court may only exercise juris-
diction over a case if an actual controversy persists throughout
each stage of litigation.15 If the dispute disappears after the filing
of the suit, the case is considered moot.16 Therefore, if a criminal
14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); Davis &
Reaves, supra note 11, at 326.
15. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, § 2.5.3 (Wolters Kluwer, 7th ed. 2016).
16. Id. § 2.5.1.
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defendant dies17 or a student challenging a university’s admission
procedures completes his or her studies during appeal,18 the federal
court is without jurisdiction to hear the case.
The mootness doctrine is derived from both constitutional and
prudential grounds. Article III of the Constitution extends federal
jurisdiction only to “Cases” and “Controversies” and generally pro-
hibits courts from issuing advisory opinions.19 Therefore, a case that
is moot does not present a justiciable controversy, and further reso-
lution would cause the court to run afoul of that prohibition.20
However, prudential factors, including conserving judicial resources
and preserving the adversarial process, also animate the mootness
doctrine.21 Therefore, the Supreme Court has often taken a flexible
approach to mootness by establishing a few exceptions to the doc-
trine,22 particularly for those issues that are capable of repetition
yet evading review and those that are resolved by a party’s volun-
tary cessation of the challenged conduct.
A. Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review
Perhaps the most notable exception to mootness is for illegal
conduct that is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”23 This
exception permits judicial review of certain injuries that are more
likely to evade the litigation process because of their limited dura-
tion.24 For the challenged illegal conduct to fit within this exception,
it must (1) be reasonably likely to happen to the plaintiff again and
(2) be so limited in duration that it is always likely to become moot
before the litigation process is complete.25
17. See Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976) (per curiam).
18. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 318 (1974) (per curiam).
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (per curiam); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
20. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 204.
21. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 2.5.1; see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)
(articulating the common justifications for justiciability doctrines). See also Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s argument that the mootness doctrine is based solely on policy judgments and not
“forced upon us by the case or controversy requirement of Art. III itself.” Honig v. Doe, 484
U.S. 305, 330 (1988) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
22. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 2.5.1.
23. S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
24. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 2.5.3.
25. Id.
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This exception may be applied in a variety of contexts, but exam-
ples of its application in election and education law are instructive.
In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that a challenge to a federal law restricting
corporate expenditures in elections was not moot, despite the fact
that the election had passed.26 The Court reasoned that the orga-
nization was likely to run similar targeted ads in future elections
and that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) was unlikely to
refrain from prosecuting future violations.27 However, in DeFunis v.
Odegaard, the Court held that a student’s challenge to a university’s
admissions procedure was moot because he was in his final semes-
ter of law school by the time the litigation reached the Supreme
Court.28 The Court reasoned that the challenged admissions pro-
cedure was unlikely to be applied to the petitioner again, and it was
not likely to evade review because other students would bring a
similar challenge if the procedures were not changed.29 Therefore,
a federal court may still exercise jurisdiction over a case that is
reasonably likely to arise with the same plaintiff again.
B. Voluntary Cessation
Another consequential exception to the mootness doctrine—and
the principal focus of this Note—is voluntary cessation. This excep-
tion states that a case will not become moot merely because the
defendant voluntarily ceases the challenged behavior if he or she is
free to continue it at any time.30 However, if “there is no reasonable
expectation that the wrong will be repeated,” the case will be ren-
dered moot.31 Although the exception seems relatively simple, courts
have struggled to articulate how likely the possibility of recurrence
needs to be and what parties, if any, are entitled to a greater pre-
sumption of good faith.
In general, the defendant bears the burden of proving the chal-
lenged conduct is unlikely to recur. Justice Ginsburg characterized
26. 551 U.S. 449, 463-64 (2007).
27. Id. at 463.
28. 416 U.S. 312, 318 (1974) (per curiam).
29. Id. at 318-19.
30. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 2.5.4.
31. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).
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this burden as “stringent,” noting that “[t]he ‘heavy burden of
persua[ding]’ the court that the challenged conduct cannot reason-
ably be expected to start up again lies with the party asserting
mootness.”32 Therefore, at least private defendants face an uphill
battle in demonstrating that their ceased behavior will not recur.
While the Supreme Court has not articulated a specific standard,
lower courts typically balance a variety of factors when determining
whether the conduct is sufficiently likely to recur. For instance, “[a]
defendant’s continued assertion of a right to engage in the allegedly
wrongful conduct, despite having ceased to do so, will generally
preclude a finding of mootness.”33 However, such an assertion may
be outweighed by other factors, such as a strong claim that the
defendant will not engage in the conduct anyway.34
The Eleventh Circuit considers a three-factor test to determine
whether the ceased conduct is likely to recur:
(1) whether the challenged conduct was isolated or uninten-
tional, as opposed to a continuing and deliberate practice; (2)
whether the defendant’s cessation of the offending conduct was
motivated by a genuine change of heart or timed to anticipate
suit; and (3) whether, in ceasing the conduct, the defendant has
acknowledged liability.35
In Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, the Eleventh Circuit conclud-
ed that an Americans with Disabilities Act challenge to a medical
facility’s service animal policy was not mooted by the fact that the
facility implemented a new policy nine months into litigation.36
Applying its three-factor test, the court found that (1) the prior
policy was the result of a years-long refusal by the owner to not
allow any animals whatsoever inside the facility, (2) the defendant’s
eleventh-hour change in policy was clearly motivated by a desire to
32. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)
(second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export
Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
33. 15 MARTIN H. REDISH, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 101.99[2][a] (3d ed. 2021).
34. See Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1176-77 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that a
prosecutor’s statement under penalty of perjury that he would not enforce a bigamy statute,
despite his continued belief in its constitutionality, justified a finding of mootness).
35. Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, 505 F.3d 1173, 1184 (11th Cir. 2007).
36. Id. at 1189.
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avoid liability, and (3) the defendant insisted that its actions were
completely legal.37
Voluntary cessation advances both the constitutional and pru-
dential justifications for mootness. If the challenged conduct has
ceased and is unlikely to recur, then there is no live controversy for
the federal court to hear pursuant to Article III’s jurisdictional
requirements.38 However, if the ceased conduct is likely to continue,
then there arguably is still a live controversy to be heard, given that
the defendant is left to return to the illegal conduct without a
judicial ruling.39 Voluntary cessation also improves judicial decision-
making by limiting judicial review to only those cases in which each
litigant has a full adversarial stake in the litigation.40 Further, vol-
untary cessation conserves judicial resources by allowing federal
courts to dismiss cases in which a judicial intervention is no longer
necessary to resolve a live controversy.41 However, this rationale
cuts both ways. Judicial resources may actually be wasted when the
voluntary cessation occurs on appeal, for instance, requiring the
court to dismiss a case that may present an important legal ques-
tion with a strong factual record.42
Thus, courts have attempted to strike the proper balance in
advancing both the constitutional and prudential justifications for
mootness through two prominent exceptions to the doctrine: capable
of repetition yet evading review and voluntary cessation. Voluntary
cessation advances these justifications by permitting courts to
retain jurisdiction over cases that still present constitutionally
sufficient live controversies, despite the defendant’s voluntarily
ceased conduct, and to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over cases that
constrain judicial resources or disrupt the adversarial process.
37. Id. at 1185-87.
38. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).
39. See id. at 318.
40. But see Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 134 n.15 (1977) (“The availability of
thoroughly prepared attorneys to argue both sides of a constitutional question, and of
numerous amici curiae ready to assist in the decisional process, even though all of them ‘stand
like greyhounds in the slips, straining upon the start,’ does not dispense with the requirement
that there be a live dispute between ‘live’ parties before we decide such a question.”).
41. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A. M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (reiterating the Court’s
commitment to intervening only in live controversies and not acting in an advisory capacity).
42. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 330 (1988) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing for
“relaxing the test of mootness where the events giving rise to the claim of mootness have
occurred after [the Court’s] decision to grant certiorari or to note probable jurisdiction”).
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However, as the next Part explores, lower courts have continually
struggled to apply the exception consistently and predictably across
issues and parties.
II. VOLUNTARY CESSATION APPLIED TO GOVERNMENT DEFENDANTS
Federal courts have particularly struggled to consistently apply
the voluntary cessation doctrine to government defendants. While
the consensus is that government defendants deserve special treat-
ment in the voluntary cessation context, courts ground that special
treatment in various rationales. The Supreme Court has held that
statutory changes generally moot a case, unless it is reasonably
likely that the statute will be reenacted.43 However, from that
deference, lower federal courts have created a presumption that all
government officials act in good faith when voluntarily ceasing
challenged conduct.44 This Part separates a sample of voluntary
cessation cases into two groups—(1) legislative-like action by elect-
ed officials and (2) discretionary action by unelected officials—to
analyze how each of these standards applies, ultimately concluding
that both are unworkable and built on shaky legal foundations.
A. Legislative-Like Action by Elected Officials
Legislative-like action by elected officials is generally sufficient
to render a case moot. This typically occurs through statutory
changes in response to litigation. The Supreme Court has rather
consistently rejected the idea that a legislature’s mere ability to
reenact the challenged statute after a dismissal justifies applying
the voluntary cessation exception.45 Rather, the Court focuses on
whether a reasonable probability of reenactment exists.46 If so, the
Court will apply voluntary cessation and the statutory change will
not moot the case.47 As Dean Chemerinsky puts it, “[t]he key
43. See Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508
U.S. 656, 662 (1993).
44. See, e.g., Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, 968 F.3d 628, 646 (7th Cir. 2020).
45. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 2.5.4 (“Usually, a statutory change is enough to
render a case moot, even though the legislature possesses the power to reinstate the allegedly
invalid law after the lawsuit is dismissed.”).
46. See id.
47. See id.
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appears to be that cases will not be dismissed as moot if the Court
believes that there is a likelihood of reenactment of a substantially
similar law if the lawsuit is dismissed.”48 However, the Court’s
application of this principle makes it clear that it is by no means a
tenable, consistently applied standard; it fails to account for im-
portant principles of state sovereignty and gives judges too much
discretion in determining when a law is sufficiently likely to be
reenacted.
New York Rifle is the most recent example of how difficult the
Court’s statutory change rule is to apply in practice. The petition-
ers in New York Rifle brought a Second Amendment challenge
against a New York City ordinance that prohibited “premises li-
cense” holders from transporting their firearms outside of the home,
except to a few preapproved ranges outside of the city.49 The city
vigorously defended the ordinance in lower courts, and both the
district court and Second Circuit upheld the law.50 However, once
the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the city amended the ordi-
nance to permit premises license holders to transport weapons to a
broader range of locations, provided that they traveled directly to
and from those destinations.51 For good measure, the New York
state legislature passed a law abrogating any city ordinance that
limited the ability of premises license holders to transport their fire-
arm to any authorized range, competition, or second home.52 Then,
the city dropped its defense of the law, arguing before the Supreme
Court that the case was now moot.53
In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court held that the statutory
change sufficiently mooted the case.54 However, the Court provided
little reasoning and cited almost none of its past voluntary cessa-
tion cases to justify its holding.55 Still, one may gather that the
Court believed that the city was sufficiently unlikely to reenact a
similar ordinance, particularly given the state legislature’s abro-
gation of any such law. Indeed, the Court has held as much in the
48. Id.
49. See 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1530 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 1532.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 1532-33.
54. Id. at 1526 (per curiam).
55. See id.
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past. In Kremens v. Bartley, the Court held that Pennsylvania’s
complete repeal of challenged mental health admission procedures
that permitted involuntary confinement of juveniles “clearly
moot[ed]” the case.56 Thus, the New York Rifle decision is at least
consistent with the Court’s precedents that a statutory change is
sufficient to moot a case.
However, the New York Rifle Court failed to distinguish its other
precedents acknowledging that a statutory change does not always
moot a case. For instance, in City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle,
Inc., the Court held that a city’s repeal of vague language in a li-
censing ordinance did not moot a vagueness challenge because the
repeal “would not preclude [the city] from reenacting precisely the
same provision if the District Court’s judgment were vacated.”57
While the ordinance in New York Rifle would face two steps to
reenactment, repeal of the state statute and the city ordinance, per-
haps distinguishing it from City of Mesquite, the obviously friendly
New York legislature would likely prove to be only a minor hurdle.
Further, in Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated Gen-
eral Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, the Court held that an equal
protection challenge to the city’s minority preference contracting
ordinance was not mooted when the city repealed and replaced the
ordinance during litigation.58 The Court reasoned that not only was
the city free to reenact a similar ordinance, but it already had
enacted one with the same constitutional infirmities as the first.59
In his vigorous New York Rifle dissent, Justice Alito made a similar
argument that the case could not be moot because the amended law
“[did] not give petitioners all the prospective relief they [sought].”60
The petitioners sought “‘unrestricted access’ to ranges, competi-
tions, and second homes outside of New York City,” but the new
amended ordinance still required direct travel between the gun own-
er’s home and the second location.61 Therefore, according to Justice
Alito, the parties “still possessed ‘a concrete interest, however small,
56. 431 U.S. 119, 129 (1977); see also Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 576 (1989)
(holding that an amendment to the challenged child pornography statute mooted the case).
57. 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982).
58. 508 U.S. 656, 662 (1993).
59. See id.
60. 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1533 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
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in the outcome of the litigation.’”62 Yet the majority failed to con-
sider any of these similarities to its contradictory case law.
The New York Rifle decision reveals that the Supreme Court’s
application of the voluntary cessation doctrine to statutory changes
is neither tenable nor consistently applied. Lower courts also strug-
gle to apply the standard to the analogous but distinct area of
regulatory changes. These sometimes legislative-like actions by
unelected government officials present an interesting combination
of both the statutory-like procedures addressed above and the
discretionary action by government officials addressed below. While
some courts treat regulatory changes somewhat differently than
statutory changes or official action, the difference does not warrant
exhaustive discussion. Rather, the Sixth Circuit’s rule is instruc-
tive: “[W]here a change is merely regulatory, the degree of solicitude
the voluntary cessation enjoys is based on whether the regulatory
processes leading to the change involved legislative-like procedures
or were ad hoc, discretionary, and easily reversible actions.”63
Therefore, regulatory changes may be subject to both the reasonable
probability of the enactment test and the good faith presumption,
depending on which category the change most mimics.64
Ultimately, whether grounded in the likelihood of reenactment65
or a presumption of good faith granted to lawmakers,66 the Court’s
mootness standard for legislative-like action by elected officials
leaves much to be desired. A standard grounded in structural
sovereignty would better respect the state’s inherent lawmaking
authority and alleviate many headaches for both public and private
litigants.
B. Discretionary Action by Unelected Officials
Federal courts generally treat voluntary cessation by government
officials with more solicitude than private defendants. While courts
62. Id. at 1534-35 (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps., 567 U.S. 298, 307-08 (2012)).
63. Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d 756, 768 (6th Cir. 2019).
64. See id.
65. See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982).
66. See Town of Portsmouth v. Lewis, 813 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2016) (presuming that
state legislature repealed bridge tolls in good faith); Coral Springs St. Sys., Inc. v. City of
Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320, 1341 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying the good faith presumption to hold
that a city’s repeal of a sign ordinance rendered the case moot).
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often use the broad term “government officials” in these cases, they
more specifically involve discretionary actions taken by unelected
government officials.67 The Supreme Court has never adopted a
different standard to be applied to such actions. However, most
federal circuits have adopted a presumption that such public
defendants act in good faith in voluntarily ceasing challenged
conduct.68 This presumption is most clearly applied in cases in-
volving university officials. This Note will focus on the Seventh
Circuit’s recent decision in Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen to explore the
contours of the good faith presumption and demonstrate why it is an
unsound doctrine divorced from the constitutional structure of
Article III.
1. Killeen and the Good Faith Presumption
The Seventh Circuit articulated the typical presumption of good
faith applied to government defendants in Killeen. In that case,
petitioners challenged several policies promulgated by the Univer-
sity of Illinois as unconstitutional restrictions on student speech.69
One of those policies prohibited students from posting election
materials about off-campus elections without prior approval from
the university.70 However, weeks after the lawsuit was filed, uni-
versity officials repealed the prior approval rule through a formal
process in the university senate.71 Through a sworn declaration of
its associate dean of students, the university asserted that it had no
intentions of reenacting the provision.72 The university argued the
case was thus moot.73
The Seventh Circuit agreed, asserting that, as “a public entity
and an arm of the state government of Illinois,” the university
“receives the presumption that it acts in good faith.”74 Therefore, the
67. For simplicity, this Section will usually refer to these actors as “government officials.”
Elected members of the legislature are also “government officials,” but courts generally treat
their actions under the standards discussed in Part II.A.
68. See Davis & Reaves, supra note 11, at 326.
69. Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, 968 F.3d 628, 632 (7th Cir. 2020).
70. Id. at 636.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 654.
74. Id. at 646.
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university’s good faith act of rescinding its prior approval rule
successfully mooted the case.75 The court appeared to ground the
presumption in the requirement that for a case to be moot it must
be absolutely clear the challenged action will not continue.76 In
doing so, the court reflected a common theme among federal
circuits: because government officials are presumed to act in good
faith, their voluntarily ceased conduct is sufficiently unlikely to
recur.77
In dissent, Judge Michael Brennan argued that the repeal of the
prior approval rule did not moot the case.78 While acknowledging
that public officials do benefit from a presumption of good faith,
Judge Brennan argued that the presumption is not absolute.79
Rather, the manner in which the public entity voluntarily ceases is
significant.80 The university’s formal amendment procedures were
self-imposed and could be swiftly undone, and the associate dean’s
statement was not binding on the university senate.81 Therefore,
the university failed to meet its heavy burden that the prior ap-
proval rule would not be reenacted, even if the university, as a
public defendant, benefits from a presumption of good faith.82
Other circuits embrace a standard similar to Judge Brennan’s.
For instance, the Sixth Circuit has held that, while the good faith
presumption applies to government officials, mootness standards
sometimes require more: “If the discretion to effect the change lies
75. Id.
76. See id. at 645 (“Indeed, a case will become moot only if it is ‘absolutely clear that the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” (quoting Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000))). The court also pointed
to the legislative-like procedure of the university’s formal amendment process to indicate that
the policy was reasonably unlikely to recur. See id. at 646.
77. See, e.g., Marcavage v. Nat’l Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 861 (3d Cir. 2012) (asserting
petitioner failed to make the requisite showing of bad faith by government officials necessary
to show the challenged policy was likely to recur); Sossamon v. Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th
Cir. 2009) (noting the standard that “government actors in their sovereign capacity and in the
exercise of their official duties are accorded a presumption of good faith” is consistent with
Laidlaw’s “heavy burden”); Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d 756, 767 (6th Cir. 2019)
(“[W]e presume that the same allegedly wrongful conduct by the government is unlikely to
recur.”).
78. See Killeen, 968 F.3d at 648 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 655.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 654, 657.
82. Id. at 657.
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with one ... individual, or there are no formal processes required to
effect the change, significantly more than the bare solicitude itself
is necessary to show that the voluntary cessation moots the claim.”83
And still others reject the good faith presumption altogether, in-
stead choosing to hold public defendants to the same heavy burden
as private defendants.84
2. The Defects of Good Faith
Several defects inherent in the good faith presumption warrant
its eradication. First, the standard is simply unworkable. Although
both the majority and dissent in Killeen claimed to apply the pre-
sumption, they disagreed significantly over its scope and the
importance of accompanying procedures to the analysis.85 Further,
the presumption is not applied consistently to similar actions by
public officials. This is most evident in the Sixth Circuit’s decision
in Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, where the court held that a uni-
versity’s voluntary cessation of an almost identical policy did not
moot the case despite the presumption.86
Second, unlike other aspects of justiciability doctrines, the pre-
sumption finds no roots in Article III of the Constitution. The nexus
between a government actor’s good faith and the existence of a live
case or controversy is tenable at best.87 Further, deferring to the
supposed public-spiritedness of government actors is drastically dif-
ferent than other prudential aspects of mootness, such as preserving
judicial economy and improving judicial decision-making, and does
little to advance those prudential aims.88
Third, the good faith presumption is antithetical to the Framers’
conception of republican governance. James Madison famously
posited “that we are governed by mere ‘men,’ not ‘angels.’ For ‘[i]f
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls
83. Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d 756, 768 (6th Cir. 2019).
84. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just. Fed. Bureau of Prisons Fed. Corr. Complex Coleman, Fla.
v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 737 F.3d 779, 783 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
85. Compare supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text, with supra notes 78-81 and
accompanying text.
86. 939 F.3d at 770.
87. See supra Part I.B.
88. See supra Part I.B.
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on government would be necessary.’”89 And while one of the aims of
republican governance is to place virtuous individuals in positions
of power,90 Madison also recognized that even virtuous rulers are
inclined to tyranny.91 Even if certain government defendants are
entitled to deference in the voluntary cessation context, the stan-
dard used to grant this deference should not perpetuate such
tyranny.
These defects certainly provide no justification for the good faith
presumption’s continued application. Federal courts, public defen-
dants, and private litigants would benefit from a clearer, more
consistently applied mootness standard grounded in structural,
rather than merely prudential, justifications.
III. MANUFACTURED MOOTNESS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Courts should first look to general principles of state sovereignty
to determine whether certain actions by government defendants—
even those actions in response to litigation—warrant deference in
the mootness context. The concept of state sovereignty has prompted
hundreds of years of debate within judicial opinions and academic
literature. This Note does not attempt to meaningfully add to that
important, ongoing debate. Rather, this Part summarizes generally
accepted principles of state sovereignty and ultimately adopts a con-
ception that respects both the sovereignty of the people as well as
the inherent sovereignty of representative government institutions.
A. Popular Sovereignty vs. Government Sovereignty
At the heart of the debate surrounding state sovereignty is the
distinction between popular sovereignty and government sover-
eignty. In their basic forms, each theory attempts to define where
the locus of political authority resides within our constitutional
89. Davis & Reaves, supra note 11, at 326 (alteration in original) (quoting THE FED-
ERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
90. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 290 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“The
aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess
most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society.”).
91. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”).
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framework. Popular sovereignty suggests such authority lies solely
with “We the People,”92 while government sovereignty suggests it
resides in the institutions of government themselves.93 This debate
is important in discerning whether government defendants should
receive any deference—rooted in structural or prudential con-
cerns—in the voluntary cessation context.
The classical conception of sovereignty originated in Europe in
the sixteenth century and represents the purest form of government
sovereignty.94 Classical sovereignty emanated from the unitary au-
thority of the monarch.95 Therefore, sovereignty “had to reside in
only one place.... [It] could not be divided or shared.”96 Sovereignty
included the power to make law, to declare war, to announce
judgements, to tax, and to coin money.97 Even those who ascribed to
social contract theories of governance “posited that men conferred
all of their powers and strength upon one man or one assembly of
men,” thereby relinquishing all sovereignty to the state.98
Most agree that the Framers explicitly rejected the classical view
of sovereignty in drafting the United States Constitution.99 How-
ever, the extent to which they did so is still hotly debated,100 and the
Framers provided little guidance themselves. The Constitution’s
endeavor to divide and limit sovereignty among three coequal
branches of the federal government, as well as between the federal
and state governments, certainly is a direct repudiation of the clas-
sical view that sovereignty must reside in a single person or institu-
tion.101 And unlike the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution
92. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1426-27,
1429-30 (1987) (arguing for “a reaffirmation and strengthening of the Federalist vision” that
sovereignty resides principally in the people of the United States as a whole).
93. See Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 335 (2005) (“[T]he
concept of sovereignty can only serve its purposes if we accept that the states are the
institutions that exercise ‘sovereign’ powers.”).
94. See id. at 239.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 240.
97. Id. at 239 (citing JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY 1-4 (Julia Franklin ed., 1992)).
98. Id. at 240 (describing Thomas Hobbes’s conception of an “omnipotent sovereign”
necessary to ensure security and to prevent political and social discord).
99. See, e.g., id. at 241.
100. See, e.g., id. at 335; Amar, supra note 92, at 1429-30.
101. Zick, supra note 93, at 241.
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contains no reference to the sovereignty of the states.102 Further, the
writers of the Federalist Papers strongly appealed to principles of
popular sovereignty. In Federalist No. 46, James Madison asserted
that “the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found,
resides in the people alone,”103 and in Federalist No. 49, he contin-
ued, “the people are the only legitimate fountain of power.”104
Therefore, the Framers clearly intended to counteract the tyranny
of classical government sovereignty with the liberty of republican
popular sovereignty.
However, it is not clear that the Framers intended to eradicate
government sovereignty altogether. To the contrary, the Federalist
Papers are laced with reassurances that the states would retain
certain elements of sovereignty. In Federalist No. 32, Alexander
Hamilton posited that “the State governments would clearly retain
all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were
not ... exclusively delegated to the United States.”105 Further, in
Federalist No. 39, James Madison asserted that the states would
retain “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all ... objects” not
enumerated to the federal government.106 Thus, it appears equally
as clear that the states retained some semblance of sovereignty
post-ratification.
This ambiguity also pervades Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Since the founding, the Court has taken various approaches to state
sovereignty, which Professor Timothy Zick distills into four different
“eras” of sovereignty: (1) presovereignty, (2) quasi-classical sover-
eignty, (3) shared sovereignty, and (4) late sovereignty.107
102. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. II (“Each state retains its
sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not
by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States.”), with U.S.CONST.pmbl. (“We
the People of the United States ... do ordain and establish this Constitution.” (emphasis
added)).
103. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 239 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
104. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 256 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 155 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
106. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 197 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); see also id.
at 195 (asserting that the people were to ratify the Constitution “not as individuals composing
one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they
respectively belong”).
107. Zick, supra note 93, at 243-46.
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The presovereignty period is characterized by seminal cases such
as Chisholm v. Georgia108 and Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,109 in which
the Marshall Court often refused to recognize state sovereignty in
its effort to craft a strong national government.110 Once those
concerns abated, the Court was more willing to recognize state
sovereignty over areas of purely “local” concern, resulting in an era
of quasi-classical sovereignty and the popular conception of “dual
sovereignty.”111 However, this goldilocks conception of state sover-
eignty could not withstand the pressures of the expanding national
authority of the New Deal Era, ushering in an era of shared sov-
ereignty.112 This era was characterized by notions of “cooperative
federalism,” in which the states merely filled gaps in national au-
thority and the Court reduced the Tenth Amendment’s attempt to
reserve some sovereignty for the states to a mere “truism.”113 Thus,
except for the brief period encompassing the quasi-classical era, the
Supreme Court has severely limited state sovereignty throughout
its history.
In contrast, the modern Court has ushered in an era of late
sovereignty characterized by a reassertion of the sovereign role of
states in federalism.114 Indeed, the Court often “flatly proclaim[s]
that the states are ‘sovereign,’ based solely upon their status as
states.”115 Under this conception of sovereignty, the Court has
invalidated many intrusions on state governments, including ex-
panding protections from civil suit through sovereign immunity116
and prohibiting the conscription of state officers and legislatures to
108. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
109. 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
110. Zick, supra note 93, at 243; see also Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 452 (“[W]hen a State, by
adopting the Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of the United
States, she has, in that respect, given up her right of sovereignty.”).
111. Zick, supra note 93, at 244 (citing United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)
for the proposition that local concerns such as “[m]anufactur[ing]” fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of sovereign states, “while ‘commerce’ was held to constitute an exclusively
national matter”).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 245 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
114. Id.
115. Id. (emphasis omitted).
116. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730-31 (1999) (holding that Congress may not use
its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
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enforce federal law.117 The Court’s jurisprudence indicates that
neither government sovereignty nor popular sovereignty has won
the day. For now, it appears that the states do enjoy certain sov-
ereign characteristics.
B. Sovereignty and Mootness
Rather than wade deeper into the sovereignty debate, this Note
adopts the assertion—supported by the apparent intent of the
Framers, modern federalism jurisprudence, and many constitutional
scholars—that the states are indeed sovereign.118 Indeed, this is
necessary for sovereignty to play any meaningful role in our consti-
tutional system:
Sovereignty retains meaningful content ... only when it resides
at least partially in governments, not solely in the hands of the
people themselves, because ‘the people’ have no efficient method
of expressing or enforcing their ‘sovereignty’ in response to the
real challenges regularly faced by political actors on the national
stage.119
Therefore, this Note rejects pure popular sovereignty, as well as
pure government sovereignty, opting instead for a standard that
properly respects the ultimate sovereignty of the people who con-
sented to the constitutional system, as well as the derivative
sovereignty possessed by those representative institutions they
established.
This is all that is necessary to achieve the modest goals of this
Note. If pure popular sovereignty reigns, then all government defen-
dants should be treated completely equal to private defendants—a
notion that is clearly disfavored among most federal courts.120 And
if pure government sovereignty reigns and sovereign acts should
receive deference in the mootness context, then all government
117. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (state executive officials); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 142 (1992) (state legislatures).
118. Zick, supra note 93, at 335 (“[T]he concept of sovereignty can only serve its purposes
if we accept that the states are the institutions that exercise ‘sovereign’ powers.”).
119. Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State Standing, 97 VA. L. REV.
2051, 2069 (2011).
120. See supra Part II.
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defendants should receive an absolute right to manufacture
mootness. By adopting a moderate approach to sovereignty—one
that focuses on the sovereign authority exercised by government
institutions on behalf of sovereign citizens121—manufactured moot-
ness is properly limited to those government defendants exercising
their sovereign interests to moot litigation.
IV. INSIGHTS FROM SOVEREIGN STATE STANDING
These same sovereign interests arise in the context of another
amorphous justiciability doctrine: standing. Insights from the robust
literature surrounding sovereign state standing—particularly, when
a state may assert sufficient sovereign interests to manufacture
such standing—are instructive. Because standing and mootness are
very similar justiciability doctrines that serve almost identical con-
stitutional and prudential aims,122 it seems natural to look toward
standing doctrine for guidance in applying mootness doctrine more
predictably. After all, “mootness [is] ‘the doctrine of standing set in
a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the
commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue through-
out its existence (mootness).’”123 And it is said that states enjoy
“special solicitude” in the standing arena based on their status as
sovereign representatives of the people.124
This Part outlines particular aspects of sovereign state standing
doctrine that will animate the discussion around sovereign state
mootness. Part IV.A briefly summarizes the doctrinal background
and central purposes of standing doctrine. Part IV.B then explores
some sovereign justifications for a robust state standing doctrine
and how those sovereign interests relate to mootness.
121. See Crocker, supra note 119, at 2069.
122. Compare supra Part I.B., with infra Part IV.A.
123. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (quoting Henry Monoghan,
Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973)). But see
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 189-90 (2000) (asserting that
this description “is not comprehensive”).
124. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
308 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:287
A. Shared Purposes and Rationales of Standing Doctrine
Similar to mootness, standing is a justiciability doctrine grounded
in both constitutional and prudential concerns. Standing doctrine,
much like its mootness counterpart, finds its roots in the case or
controversy requirement of Article III.125 Standing also serves an
important function in preserving the separation of powers by
limiting judicial review solely to those issues that are the proper
province of the judiciary.126 Further, standing serves the same
prudential aims of judicial economy and sound judicial decision-
making as mootness.127 Requiring each litigant to have a concrete
stake in the outcome of the case deters frivolous litigation by those
with only a generalized interest in the outcome and ensures that
each side of the case is presented by a sufficiently motivated ad-
vocate.128 These constitutional and prudential concerns lie at the
heart of each of the standing requirements.
While standing, much like all justiciability doctrines, is rather
amorphous, its traditional definition contains three requirements:
injury in fact, causation, and redressability.129 The plaintiff ’s as-
serted injury must be derived from the “invasion of a legally
protected interest” that is (1) “concrete and particularized” and (2)
“actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”130 Moreover,
the injury must be “fairly ... trace[able]” to the defendant’s action
and “likely” to be “redressed by a favorable [court] decision.”131
Despite the Court’s attempt in cases such as Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife to clearly define the standing doctrine, these requirements
have often been applied inconsistently and incoherently across
cases.132 As discussed below, this is particularly true when states,
not individuals, assert standing to sue.
125. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
126. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of Art. III standing is built
on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”).
127. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 2.3.1.
128. Id.
129. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
130. Id. at 560 (citations omitted).
131. Id. at 560-61 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted).
132. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 2.3.1.
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B. Sovereign Interests, State Standing, and Sovereign State
Mootness
Special problems arise when states, as opposed to individuals,
assert invasions of a legally protected interest. States generally
assert injuries to their proprietary, quasi-sovereign, and sovereign
interests in order to sue in federal court. And just as a state may
manufacture standing based on its sovereign interests, so should a
state be able to manufacture mootness pursuant to those same
interests.
1. Overview of State Interests
Scholars identify three main categories of asserted state interests
in the standing context. Proprietary interests encompass a state’s
ability to sue to protect common law interests available to any
private litigant.133 These include causes of action in tort or contract
law and typically derive from a state’s status as a property owner.134
Given that these interests only implicate the state’s action as any
other private litigant, the interests clearly cannot serve as a justifi-
cation for treating the government differently with respect to
mootness.
Similarly, quasi-sovereign interests provide little guidance in the
mootness context. These encompass a state’s interest “in the well-
being of its populace,”135 and implicate state sovereignty in that they
“stem from the state’s role as ‘protect[or of] its citizens’ general
interests.’”136 However, they are quasi-sovereign in that they are
derived from interests of the state citizenry and not held independ-
ently by the state itself in its sovereign capacity.137 While such
interests were historically derided as generalized grievances by
federal courts,138 they became an integral component of the “special
133. See Crocker, supra note 119, at 2055-56.
134. See id. at 2056.
135. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982).
136. Crocker, supra note 119, at 2064 (alteration in original) (citing Ann Woolhandler &
Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 432-33 (1995)).
137. See id. at 2068.
138. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA.L.REV. 387, 432-33
(1995) (discussing how early cases addressing quasi-sovereign interests required a showing
of injury to both state property and citizen welfare). But see Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S.
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solicitude” afforded states in the Supreme Court’s seminal state
standing case, Massachusetts v. EPA.139 However, such interests are
relatively inapplicable to the mootness context. A state can assert
these unique interests as a plaintiff, but it is unclear when, if ever,
a state would assert its quasi-sovereign interests as a defendant in
order to moot litigation.
Rather, a state’s pure sovereign interests—derived from inde-
pendent governance rather than collective representation—will form
the backbone of the type of interests a state may assert to strategi-
cally moot litigation. Sovereign interests include a state’s interest
in its core ability to govern.140 These interests may take on a variety
of different forms, including “[g]overning [i]nterests” and “[e]nforce-
ment [i]nterests.”141 Governing interests are implicated “[w]hen a
state sues to establish its authority to exercise legislative, executive,
or judicial power within a particular territory or over a particular
subject matter.”142 In doing so, the state typically seeks to vindicate
its interest against another government to protect its inherent
sovereignty, most often in border disputes.143 Enforcement interests
are implicated when a state seeks to enforce its laws against
individuals.144 States exercise their sovereign authority to pursue
certain interests through legislation, and enforcement of those
interests, particularly in federal court, is an essential aspect of state
sovereignty.145
While the Supreme Court was initially reluctant to acknowledge
state standing to sue on its sovereign interests, the modern Court
has routinely accepted state sovereign standing. Famously, in
Chisholm v. Georgia, the Court refused to recognize state sover-
eignty altogether, resulting in intense backlash and the adoption of
at 602; Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Crocker, supra note 119, at
2065-66 (acknowledging the gradual recognition of quasi-sovereign interests in Alfred L.
Snapp & Son and Tennessee Copper).
139. 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).




144. Id.; see also Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, E. Duncan Getchell, Jr. & Wesley G. Russell,
Jr., State Sovereign Standing: Often Overlooked, but Not Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. 89, 109
(2012) (“This unique, sovereign power of states—to enact and enforce a code of laws—makes
them unlike any other litigant.”).
145. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 138, at 411.
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the Eleventh Amendment.146 In Georgia v. Stanton, the Court out-
right refused to recognize sovereign state standing in Georgia’s
challenge to the Reconstruction Acts, holding that sovereignty rights
present pure political questions.147
Despite this early trend against sovereign state standing, modern
cases have recognized a state’s ability to sue on its sovereign in-
terests.148 For instance, South Carolina v. Katzenbach permitted
state standing to sue on state sovereignty grounds.149 In Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, the Supreme Court
expressly recognized “[t]wo sovereign interests”: “First, the exercise
of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant
jurisdiction—this involves the power to create and enforce a legal
code, both civil and criminal; second, the demand for recognition
from other sovereigns—most frequently this involves the mainte-
nance and recognition of borders.”150 And in Virginia House of
Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, the Court expressly stated that “[o]f
course, ‘a State has standing to defend the constitutionality of its
statute.’”151 Therefore, invasions of sovereign interests clearly
present litigable injuries upon which states may sue.152
2. Manufactured Sovereign State Standing
A controversial implication of granting states standing based on
sovereign interests is the ability for a state to manufacture standing
through legislation. For example, a state can theoretically pass leg-
islation that directly conflicts with a federal law in order to
challenge the constitutionality of the federal law. Based on the
146. 2 U.S. 419, 472-73 (1793); see also Crocker, supra note 119, at 2057 & n.14.
147. 73 U.S. 50, 77 (1867) (“[T]he rights for the protection of which our authority is
invoked, are the rights of sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government, of corporate
existence as a State, with all its constitutional powers and privileges. No case of private rights
... is presented by the bill, in a judicial form, for the judgment of the court.”).
148. This is consistent with the modern Court’s conception of state sovereignty. See supra
Part III.A.
149. See 383 U.S. 301, 323-29 (1966).
150. 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).
151. 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1951 (2019) (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986)).
152. See Crocker, supra note 119, at 2063-64 (“[O]nly once, with the whole of
Reconstruction at stake in Stanton, did [the Court] expressly deny a state standing to
vindicate its sovereign interests.... [T]he Court has since ... recogniz[ed] states’ sovereign
interests as enforceable in federal courts.”).
312 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:287
sovereign standing doctrine outlined above, the state would have a
legally protected interest in its core ability to enact and enforce its
legal code, granting it standing to challenge a contrary federal
law.153
This was the exact issue presented by Virginia’s challenge to the
Affordable Care Act (ACA). In March 2010, as President Obama’s
signature health care law awaited final passage in Congress,
Virginia passed the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act (VHCFA).154
The VHCFA provided that “[n]o resident of this Commonwealth ...
shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual
insurance coverage.”155 This provision operated as a direct response
to the ACA’s individual mandate and was a clear attempt to create
state standing to challenge the constitutionality of the ACA.
The district court held that Virginia did have standing and found
the individual mandate unconstitutional.156 However, the Fourth
Circuit disagreed.157 It held that the challenge was not predicated
on Virginia’s sovereign interests because the VHCFA was merely
declaratory and contained no enforcement provision.158 Therefore,
the ACA’s individual mandate did not threaten “Virginia’s power to
create and enforce a legal code.”159 Rather, the VHCFA merely an-
nounced “an unenforceable policy goal” rooted in the state’s
“attempted vindication of its citizens’ interests.”160 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit characterized Virginia’s asserted interest as merely a quasi-
sovereign interest in protecting its citizens from the enforcement of
federal law.161
In an older case, Massachusetts v. Laird, the Massachusetts state
legislature sought to manufacture standing to challenge the consti-
tutionality of the Vietnam War by passing a statute prohibiting its
citizens from engaging in foreign combat not authorized by Congress
153. See Va. House of Delegates, 139 S. Ct. at 1951.
154. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 267 (4th Cir. 2011).
155. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting VA. CODE. ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2010)).
156. Id. at 266.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 269-70.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 269, 271.
161. See id. at 271.
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pursuant to the War Powers Clause.162 The Massachusetts statute
faced the same troubles with respect to sovereign versus quasi-
sovereign interests as the VHCFA.163 The state asserted its quasi-
sovereign interest in protecting its citizens from the detrimental
impacts of an allegedly unconstitutional war;164 however, it likely
could have asserted a sovereign interest in enforcing a legal code
designed to protect its own citizens. Regardless, the Supreme Court
summarily denied the state’s complaint without comment.165
However, Justice Douglas wrote an impassioned dissent urging the
Court to grant Massachusetts standing, implicitly recognizing the
possibility of manufactured sovereign standing.166
Despite federal courts’ apparent skepticism toward manufactured
sovereign standing and the Fourth Circuit’s alarmist discussion of
its implications in the VHCFA decision, scholars assert that there
is no compelling distinction between regular sovereign standing and
manufactured sovereign standing.167 To truly respect the structural
characteristics of sovereign states inherent in our Constitution,
courts must recognize this peculiar consequence of sovereign
standing.168 Moreover, alarmist worries about the deleterious effects
of such behavior are likely misplaced. Instances of manufactured
standing simply do not arise with sufficient regularity to justify
intruding on such a core component of state sovereignty, and states
are almost always able to assert some other sufficient injury.169 The
ability to manufacture standing in certain instances is a peculiar
characteristic of sovereignty that warrants a closer look at how
sovereign states may also manufacture mootness.
162. 400 U.S. 886, 886 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Crocker, supra note 119,
at 2076.
163. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 271.
164. See Crocker, supra note 119, at 2076-77.
165. Laird, 400 U.S. at 886.
166. See id. at 887-91 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
167. See Crocker, supra note 119, at 2099 (“[R]especting states’ fundamental constitutional
sovereignty is surely sufficient justification for tolerating a minor strain on the judiciary.”).
But see Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L.REV.851,
878 (2016) (asserting that states do not have the same interest in mere “declaratory” laws—
such as the VHCFA—and therefore “need not have standing ... to protect the ‘continued
enforceability’ of a law that will never be enforced”).
168. See Crocker, supra note 119, at 2099.
169. See id.
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3. Sovereign Interests and Manufactured Mootness
Just as states have standing to protect their sovereign inter-
ests—and even the ability to manufacture standing in their
sovereign capacity—states should be able to assert those same
interests in order to moot litigation in their sovereign capacity. This
is consistent with states’ sovereign governing and enforcement
interests.170 The implicit recognition of this basic characteristic of
sovereignty likely motivates courts’ decisions to treat public
defendants differently in the voluntary cessation context. Further,
courts’ failure to ground that distinction in structural sovereignty
principles has likely led to the confusion and disparate application
of voluntary cessation to public defendants.171
Just as a sovereign state has an interest in enacting and enforc-
ing a legal code,172 it likewise has an interest in amending or
repealing a previously enacted legal code, even in response to liti-
gation. And that decision should be given deference by federal
courts in the voluntary cessation context. Therefore, it is the sov-
ereign act itself—not a diminished likelihood of recurrence or a
presumption of good faith—that triggers mootness.
This is not to say that all sovereign acts altering a challenged
legal code are sufficient to render the challenge moot. The act must
still provide the challengers with all of the relief they seek.173
Therefore, Justice Alito’s discussion of whether the amended
ordinance in New York Rifle granted gun owners all of the relief
they sought becomes even more relevant.174 Further, as the Supreme
Court held just last term, viable claims for money damages—
including nominal damages—are sufficient to maintain a live,
redressable injury and preclude mootness.175 This should provide
170. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 138, at 411.
171. See supra Part II.
172. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).
173. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1533-35 (2020)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
174. See id.
175. Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 801-02 (2021); see also 13 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3533.3 (3d ed. 2020) (“Untold numbers of cases illustrate the rule that a claim for money
damages is not moot, no matter how clear it is that the claim arises from events that have
completely concluded without any prospect of recurrence. The Supreme Court has made the
point several times. Lower courts enforce the principle continually.”); N.Y. Rifle, 140 S. Ct.
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protection for plaintiffs facing a more government-friendly mootness
standard. However, the state’s sovereign act of lawmaking should
create a strong presumption of mootness.
There is little cause for worry about recognizing states’ sovereign
ability to moot challenges to their sovereign interests. Just as in the
context of manufactured standing, there are inherent limitations to
a state’s ability to manufacture mootness at will.176 The group of
entities that possess the power to strategically moot cases based on
sovereign interests is relatively small, limited primarily to elected
government officials exercising legislative-like action. Therefore,
despite the fact that states face an infinite number of suits against
them, it is unlikely that a state will be able to strategically moot
cases with impunity.177 Moreover, a much more powerful tool than
judicial resolution exists to keep sovereign strategic mooting in
check: political accountability. Presumably, a citizenry fed up with
a constant flip-flopping of consequential laws in order to avoid
litigation will be able to proverbially “vote the bums out.”178 This
political accountability provides an important check on any poten-
tial abuse of a more deferential standard for government defen-
dants.
Thus, the same sovereign interests that grant states broad
standing equally justify manufactured sovereign state mootness.
And limiting the state’s ability to engage in strategic mooting solely
to litigation that involves a challenge to the state’s sovereign law-
making authority should assuage fears that governments could
manipulate federal jurisdiction and violate rights with impunity.
at 1526.
176. However, concerns about manufactured standing still abound. See, e.g., Virginia ex rel.
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 267 (2011). But see Crocker, supra note 119, at 2099.
177. See Tara Leigh Grove, Some Puzzles of State Standing, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1883,
1887 (2019) (acknowledging that a finite number of state attorneys general with limited
resources supports the argument that “broad state standing will not flood the federal courts
with cases”).
178. See id. (acknowledging that political restraints may prevent state attorneys general
from abusing broad state standing).
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V. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: WHEN MAY STATES MANUFACTURE
MOOTNESS?
The foregoing discussion presents a new standard to apply to acts
of voluntary cessation by public defendants, what this Note calls the
sovereignty standard. This Part applies the sovereignty standard to
the same categories of government action discussed in Part II:
legislative-like action by elected officials and discretionary action by
unelected officials.
A. Legislative-Like Action by Elected Officials
States should always be permitted to strategically moot a case by
repealing or amending a challenged law, so long as the change
affords the challenger all of the relief he or she seeks. This strikes
right at the heart of the state’s sovereign interest in enforcing a
legal code179 and is consistent with much of the Supreme Court’s
application of voluntary cessation to statutory changes.180 Therefore,
this sovereignty-based standard is unlikely to change the outcome
of any of the Supreme Court’s statutory changes precedents.
The sovereignty standard would be unlikely to be outcome-
determinative if applied to the Supreme Court’s past statutory
changes cases. For instance, returning to New York Rifle, New York
City’s repeal of its gun ordinance and the state legislature’s ab-
rogation of similar laws is a clear example of a state asserting its
sovereign interest in repealing and amending a legal code in order
to moot litigation.181 Therefore, the challenge is likely to remain
moot under the sovereignty standard.182 Further, the equal protec-
tion challenge in Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated
General Contractors v. City of Jacksonville is likely to remain not
179. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982);
Crocker, supra note 119, at 2063-64; Cuccinelli et al., supra note 144, at 109.
180. See N.Y. Rifle, 140 S. Ct. at 1526; Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 125-27 (1977).
181. See N.Y. Rifle, 140 S. Ct. at 1526.
182. This is, of course, assuming that the majority was correct in asserting that the
amended ordinance gave the gun owners the precise relief they requested. See id.
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moot given that the Court found that the amended ordinance
contained the same constitutional infirmities as the first.183
Similarly, the sovereignty standard is unlikely to affect the
outcome of many regulatory changes cases. However, the standard
may provide better justifications for how to approach certain
regulatory changes. Again, taking the Sixth Circuit’s rule as a
model, regulatory changes that are subject to formal, legislative-like
procedures are more akin to statutory changes and subject to
similar accountability protections.184 Therefore, such regulatory
changes may enjoy the same level of deference as sovereign state
decisions to amend or alter a statute.185 However, those regulatory
changes that are “ad hoc, discretionary, and easily reversible” are
not sufficiently analogous to the state’s sovereign lawmaking
authority to warrant special treatment.186 In that sense, such
changes are more like discretionary actions taken by unelected
government officials and should be subject to the same heavy
burden as private defendants in the voluntary cessation context.
Even though the standard advocated by this Note likely does not
change the ultimate outcome of many of the Supreme Court’s statu-
tory or regulatory changes cases, adopting a standard grounded in
state sovereignty—not judicial determinations about the likelihood
of reenactment or prudential assessments of good faith—better
respects the sovereign judgments of elected officials. Such a stan-
dard is likely to result in a more consistent application of voluntary
cessation doctrine to government defendants.
B. Discretionary Action by Unelected Officials
Voluntary cessation of discretionary action by unelected govern-
ment officials is almost never sufficiently related to the state’s
sovereign interest in governing or enforcing a legal code to justify a
relaxed standard. As action becomes removed from the state’s
sovereign governing and enforcement interests, the sovereignty
183. See 508 U.S. 656, 662 (1993).
184. See Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d 756, 768 (6th Cir. 2019).
185. See supra Part II.A.
186. See Schlissel, 939 F.3d at 768.
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rationale falls apart.187 Officials that are “public” only in the sense
that they are employed by a government entity, such as university
officials, do not benefit from the same sovereignty concerns as the
state legislature or elected executive officials.188 Therefore, such
government officials should be held to the same voluntary cessation
standards as private litigants.
When government officials’ acts of voluntary cessation must meet
the same heavy burden as private litigants, the potential dangers
of manufactured mootness are mitigated. For instance, in Killeen,
if the university officials did not receive the benefit of a good faith
presumption, they would have had to prove that no possibility
existed that the prior approval rule would be reenacted.189 In that
case, just as Judge Brennan concluded, self-imposed procedures and
noncommittal statements are unlikely to satisfy such a rigorous
standard.190
Therefore, the sovereignty standard does away with the good faith
presumption and requires almost all unelected government officials
voluntarily ceasing discretionary actions to meet the same rigorous
voluntary cessation standard applied to private litigants.
CONCLUSION
This Note presents an alternative standard for applying the moot-
ness doctrine’s voluntary cessation exception to public defendants.
Rather than relying on judicial determinations of the likelihood that
a government policy will be reenacted or prudential considerations
of the supposed good faith of public officials, this Note focuses on a
standard grounded in state sovereignty. The same sovereign
governing and enforcement interests that provide states broad
standing to sue in federal court grant states the sovereign authority
to alter a legal code in order to moot litigation. However, this
justification applies only to actions taken in close proximity to the
187. The state’s governing and enforcement interests are almost always associated with
the state legislature or elected executive officials. See Cuccinelli et al., supra note 144, at 109.
188. Action by such public officials is more analogous to state proprietary interests than
purely sovereign interests. See supra Part III.B.
189. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000).
190. See Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, 968 F.3d 628, 657 (7th Cir. 2020) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Schlissel, 939 F.3d at 768.
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state’s sovereign lawmaking authority. Therefore, public officials
removed from that lawmaking process—such as university
officials—must meet the same heavy burden faced by every private
litigant in voluntary cessation cases.
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